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Abstract  
This paper discusses the use of benchmarking in general and its application to the drinking water sector. It 
systematizes the various classifications on performance measurement, discusses some of the pitfalls of 
benchmark studies and provides some examples of benchmarking in the water sector. After presenting in detail 
the institutional framework of the water sector of the Belgian region of Flanders (without benchmarking 
experiences), Wallonia (recently started a public benchmark) and the Netherlands (introduced already in 1997 a 
public benchmark), we non-parametrically measure the productivity gains by the use of a dynamic Malmquist 
index. The three regions, each at a different stage of the benchmarking circle, exhibit different performance 
trends. The ‘carrot’ and the ‘stick’ of benchmarking seem to offer an effective incentive to trigger performance. 
In addition, the Malmquist decompositions provide some evidence on the ‘gaming’ of the stakeholders by the 
water utilities.  
Keywords: Benchmarking; gaming; Malmquist decomposition; regulation; water sector.  
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Performance assessment encompasses the evaluation of efficiency (doing the things right) and 
effectiveness (doing the right things) of activities and processes and it is used for several ends and in 
different fields. If performance is assessed in the water sector, the utilities generally show a large 
potential performance gap. This can mainly be attributed to the presence of market failures, such as 
monopoly power, scale and scope economies, sunk costs and assets, services of general economic 
interest obligations and asymmetric information (Marques, 2005). In this context, performance 
assessment turns out to be an effective tool to guide managers, saving resources and improving the 
quality of service delivered.  
                                                
1
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As benchmarking and performance assessment are only light-handed regulatory tools, their importance 
is often undervalued. In this paper, we discuss the terminology, the classification and the main 
concerns that should be taken into account when benchmarking is employed. We apply the concepts 
and nomenclature to the water sector, although extensions to other sectors are generally 
straightforward. 
Besides an extensive discussion on the concept of benchmarking, this paper contributes to the 
literature by an in depth analysis of the Dutch, Flemish and Walloon (the latter two are regions of 
Belgium) water sector. We especially emphasize the institutional framework and its benchmarking 
experiences. As the three regions are very similar in most of the relevant exogenous environmental 
characteristics (such as population density, geographical relief, weather conditions, expectations and 
demand of the customers, etc.), and as they have different experiments with benchmarking, it is very 
interesting and relevant to compare them from an institutional point of view. Indeed, whereas the 
Flemish region did not implement benchmarking or economic regulation, the Walloon sector started 
recently a public benchmark in the sense of ‘sunshine regulation’  (i.e. the comparison of utilities is 
used to ‘embarrass’  the least performing utilities and to put the best performing utilities into the 
limelight). Contrarily, the Dutch sector started a sunshine regulatory benchmark already in 1997. 
As a third contribution to the literature, we estimate the performance of the water utilities in the 
different regions over time. Therefore, we apply a non-parametric (i.e. without a priori assumptions on 
the functional form of the production process) Malmquist index based on data envelopment analysis 
(DEA). This allows us to decompose productivity gains into gains arising from technical progress and 
gains from catch-up efficiency. To our best knowledge, this is a first similar decomposition for water 
utilities in the Low Countries.  
Finally, we interpret and link the Malmquist decompositions to a ‘gaming’  framework (Jamasb et al., 
2003, 2004). Indeed, water utilities, as any economic agent, have their own agenda and act and react to 
incentives. The benchmark and the public debate provide incentives to the utilities. In turn, the utilities 
try to ‘game’  the system by changing their behavior  
The paper unfolds as follows. The next section discusses the use and pitfalls of benchmarking. Section 
3 and 4 describe, respectively, the institutional framework of the Dutch and Belgian water sector. 
Section 5 explains the methodology, while Section 6 interprets the results. Finally, Section 7 analyses 
the gaming aspects and Section 8 provides the concluding remarks.  
 
 
2. THE CONCEPT OF BENCHMARKING 
 
2.1 Performance assessment 
 
Different performance measures can be employed to assess performance, such as (1) performance 
indicators, (2) performance indices and (3) performance levels (Alegre, 2007). Firstly, performance 
indicators are a quantified ratio expressing the way or intensity by which a given activity is 
accomplished. Including one productive factor in the numerator and one in the denominator, they are 
only a partial a-dimensional (in %) or intensive (in e.g. euro/m³) measure of productivity (sometimes 
even distorted). Besides other productive factors that influence the performance of a particular activity 
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or process, there are explanatory factors that become key elements in the analysis of the scores 
obtained, although they are not intended to be a characteristic of the organization (e.g. population 
density).2 Performance indicators are mainly used by operators and regulators for supervising the 
quality of service. Secondly, performance indices aggregate various performance variables in one 
value. Popular performance indices are Total Factor Productivity and Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA). Although in comparison to performance indicators, indices could better capture reality, they 
often encompass judgment values (e.g. the discretionary adoption of variables or weights) and work as 
a black box making it hard to understand how the inputs are transformed into outputs. Performance 
indices are often specially tailored for regulators, mainly if they adopt performance based regulation in 
the tariff setting process, such as price cap and/or yardstick competition methods. Finally, performance 
levels are related to qualitative measures associated with the quality of service provided. They are 
represented by discrete categories such as ‘very good’ , ‘good’ , ‘fair’  and ‘poor’ , and are particularly 
useful for the customers to assess the service provided when the quantification of the measures is 
troublesome.  
 
2.2 Classifications of benchmarking 
 
Performance assessment is not synonymous with benchmarking, even though the terms are often 
mixed up. Benchmarking is a narrower concept as it also encompasses the comparison with other 
peers and standards. Camp (1989) refers to benchmarking as “the search for industry best practices 
that lead to superior performance”.  
Traditionally in the water sector, benchmarking methods are classified into metric benchmarking and 
process benchmarking (Kingdom et al., 1996). The former refers to the comparative and quantitative 
process that enables the operators to keep track of their performance through time and compare it with 
other (similar) operators. The latter identifies, in a first phase, the aspects to be improved through a 
step-by-step procedure (process mapping) and, in a second phase, compares them with the best 
practices from other operators. Metric benchmarking intends to answer the question about what to 
improve, whereas process benchmarking aims at answering the question of how to improve. In spite of 
other useful classifications of benchmarking, depending on the technique used (e.g. total or partial 
methods, non-parametric versus parametric techniques) or the aim (e.g. regulatory or non-regulatory), 
we can look at these tools concerning their end users.   
Metric benchmarking determines the current performance levels and establishes appropriate reference 
values. However, process benchmarking goes one step beyond as it discriminates the existing 
processes in a given organization, compares them with other organizations with exceptional 
performance in similar processes (best in class) and defines changes regarding each process to achieve 
or overcome the performance aims set.3 
                                                
2
 For example, a performance indicator that intends to analyze the productivity of staff can be captured by the 
number of employees per customer, per mains length or per volume of distributed water. On the one hand, 
different indicators can capture the performance of the same variable. On the other hand, two equal scores do not 
have the same evaluation if the network age differs.     
3
 This type of benchmarking, known as “Xerox-style benchmarking”, was developed by the Xerox Corporation in 
the 1970s in order to compete with the Japanese enterprises (Kingdom, 1998). 
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Clearly, there are two schools of benchmarking practitioners, i.e. those focused on economical issues 
and those motivated by operational aspects. On the one hand, the economical issues are of interest to 
regulators, government agencies and supra-national institutions which mostly use metric 
benchmarking, particularly performance indices or performance indicators. On the other hand, 
operational issues are, among others, addressed by water utilities that are using process benchmarking, 
mainly by performance indicators.  
In Figure 1, we schematically present a metric benchmark. Firstly, for the evaluated activity, it has to 
be decided on the performance measure and the measurement criteria (e.g. to measure the water losses 
the non-revenue water volume by pipe extension and per hour can be used as criterion or, with the 
same aim, the non-revenue water by customer and per day). Secondly, after computing the measure, 
the explanatory values that may influence the performance are examined. They are divided into 
controllable and non-controllable, depending on the capability of the utilities to tackle them in the long 
run. For example, managers can influence the age of assets in the long but not in the short run. In its 
turn, the age of assets have considerable consequences in leakage. Therefore, performance indicators 
concerning leakage should take this explanatory factor into account. In addition to leakage, for 
instance, the type of soil is always non-controllable. Besides explanatory factors, we should establish 
optimal or reference values for the performance measure. If the best practices are not available or are 
far from the current performance, the reference values can be compared with scores from past periods. 
The comparison with reference values is crucial in the analysis. Indeed, the utilities should use these 
reference values as objectives to accomplish in the following periods.  
When using performance indicators, despite the different arrangements defined in the literature (e.g. 
by the International Water Association (IWA), the American Water Works Association (AWWA) or 
the World Bank systems), one should note that there are no performance indicators systems a la 
carte.4 A performance indicators set should be defined according to the needs of the evaluated entity, 
trying to use the most adequate language and terminology. 
Figure 2 shows one of the first cases of process benchmarking in the water sector. It corresponds to the 
water leakage reduction plan conducted by the Philadelphia Water Department. Although neither 
regulators nor other government agencies do employ process benchmarking, they have all the 
motivation to encourage this kind of exercises in the water sector because, as a rule, they contribute 
for performance improvement (Parena et al., 2002). Process benchmarking produces good results, 
showing “how to improve” and not only “what to improve”.  
                                                
4
 See the IB-NET tool kit (www.ib-net.org/), Alegre et al. (2006) and Lafferty and William (2005). 
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Performance 
assessment
Reference values
Process or activity 
under analysis
Measurement criteria
Explanatory factors 
 
Figure 1 – Application scheme of metric benchmarking  
 
   
 
Figure 2 – Application scheme of process benchmarking (Freeman et al., 1998) 
 
2.3 Pitfalls of benchmarking 
 
The application of benchmarking leads to a better knowledge of the other operators. It allows the 
operators to reduce the performance gap to achieve the best practices. However, in applying 
benchmarking some cautions should be taken (see Marques and Witte, 2008). Firstly, the 
organizations or activities which are subject to benchmarking must be comparable (like with like). 
Although heterogeneity can be modeled and included in the analysis, a very big difference will bias 
the analysis (e.g. a water utility of 1,000,000 inhabitants should not be compared with a utility of 
1,000 inhabitants). Secondly, to avoid a simplistic analysis, all variables should be weighted. Thirdly, 
benchmarking requires patience as the process is not immediate and the results are not promptly 
tangible. It is necessary to look for a consensus among stakeholders to assure continuity through time 
and to define medium and long term goals so that the system of performance measurement may be 
successful and produce the desired results. Benchmarking application, as well as performance 
measurement in general, should not be an aim in itself. Fourthly, in benchmarking some results are 
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expected to be obtained. Performance should be objectively evaluated by displaying the areas where 
improvement is needed and by identifying other organizations whose processes show a higher 
performance with the aim of adopting them and testing whether the improvement programs are 
successful. Fifthly, the generated transparency allows for a better understanding of performance as 
benchmarking allows for insights in the way the utility works. However, as a drawback, the 
probability of a status quo in the organization being affected is large. 
The scope of the benchmark should comprise the organization as a whole, focusing on the objectives 
and the customers. Besides, benchmarking provides more questions than answers. The evaluation 
should focus on and provide evidence of the aspects that the managers are able to control. Ranking by 
itself should not be an end to the process of evaluation. On the contrary, it should be a tool for change 
towards excellence. Finally, it should be highlighted that benchmarking is a cyclic and permanent 
process. The identification, understanding and implementation of best practices should not be seen as 
an occasional and solitary task, but as an activity that is entangled in the organizational culture where 
there is a need for continuous improvement. Nevertheless, one should be aware that the process of 
improvement is continuous and time consuming. 
 
2.4 Benchmarking experiences in the water sector 
 
Benchmarking is being applied worldwide in the water sector. Governments and professional 
associations in each country are promoting benchmarking exercises as a leverage on performance 
improvement. The water utilities are also more and more interested in the use of benchmarking. Even 
in countries without regulators, as the majority in Europe, benchmarking experiences have been in 
progress with success. A new regulatory paradigm based on yardstick competition, and therefore on 
benchmarking, has been proposed for the water sector (Marques and De Witte, 2008).5 For example, in 
Europe there are experiences of benchmarking by the regulators as in Portugal (Institute for the 
Regulation of Water and Waste - IRAR), England and Wales (Water Services Regulation Authority 
(Ofwat)] and Belgium (in Wallonia by the Committee for Water Control), by the association of water 
utilities as in Sweden [The Swedish Water & Wastewater Association (SWWA)], Denmark [Danish 
Water and Waste Water Association (DANVA)] or Holland (Association of Dutch Water Utilities - 
VEWIN) and by the water utilities consortia like 6-cities in Scandinavia or the Water Utility 
Management Plan (WUMP) 2050 in Sweden. Other initiatives are being developed in Germany, 
Norway, France, Slovenia, Slovakia and Czech Republic. Outside Europe the picture is not different. 
Besides, the supra-continent projects like the ones of IWA, Word Bank or World Health Organization, 
Australia, Brazil, Argentina, the USA and Canada are some of the good examples of benchmarking 
application. In the next section we analyze in detail the experiences of the Low Countries. The 
development of the institutional framework of the water sectors in Belgium (in particular its regions 
Flanders and Wallonia) and in The Netherlands has been related to their performance assessment. The 
water utilities, intending to avoid reforms, ‘game’  their respective governments and stakeholders 
looking for the maintenance of the status quo and the quiet life. This gaming is discussed in Section 7 
                                                
5
 Yardstick competition always implies the application of benchmarking but it is not a regulatory method. There 
are two types of yardstick competition in the water sector, respectively the ’ price yardstick competition’  and 
’ sunshine regulation’  (Marques, 2006). The latter entails the comparison and public discussion of performance 
of the water utilities. 
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after we carefully described the institutional framework in the drinking water sectors of Flanders, 
Wallonia and the Netherlands. 
 
 
3. THE DUTCH WATER SECTOR 
 
As a water rich country, since the middle ages the Netherlands had to learn how to manage their water 
resources in order to survive and to recover land on the sea. This involvement of all citizens in the 
fight against water is still reflected in the current regulatory and institutional framework. For example, 
the Dutch citizens are heavily involved in the water production, distribution and preservation process 
by the democratically elected ‘water boards’ , which are an inheritance of the medieval fight against 
water. Although the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affaires launched in 1997 a report on the 
privatization of water services, only six years later is the drinking water sector protected as fully 
public domain. In this section, we describe the institutional and regulatory changes in the Dutch 
drinking water sector which lay the foundation of this policy shift.  
 
3.1 The institutional framework 
 
The legislative powers in the Dutch drinking water sector are, in the unitary decentralized state, 
divided over the State, the provinces, the municipalities and the water boards. The latter is a special 
governmental agency responsible for the water management. At the State level, the Ministry of 
Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM) and the Ministry of Transport, Public Works 
and Water Management (V&W) are ultimately responsible for the largely decentralized water sector. 
The former concerns the drinking water sector, while the latter deals with the sewage sector and 
surface water quality. Even though the provincial authorities can outline their own policy plans, they 
mainly act as a coordination device between the State, the municipalities and the water boards (in both 
directions). In addition, they are shareholders in the water utilities and in the performance of this role 
they supervise the drinking water tariffs (together with the municipalities). The municipalities are also 
responsible for the collection of sewage. The most typical Dutch drinking water institutions are the 
water boards which are responsible for the water management (including e.g. the dunes, dikes and 
levees), water infrastructure, water quality and the treatment of sewage. In 2007, there were 27 water 
boards consisting of democratically elected representatives of four relevant categories of stakeholders: 
residents of the area, landowners, company owners and real estate owners. In recent years, the turnout 
percentage at elections was rather low (25%). The continuous monitoring of the water quality by both 
the water boards and the other government levels makes it relatively easy for the Dutch water utilities 
to comply with the strict European directives. The drinking water companies are responsible for the 
delivery of water in their legal monopolistic provision area.  
The utilities faced two merger waves in the past. In the first merger wave, around 1920, the companies 
searched for a scale increase to comply with new environmental legislation. The second merger wave, 
around the late 1990s, was originated from the search for scale economies, improved corporate 
governance, stricter environmental requirements and the pressure of the national and provincial 
authorities to have one supplier per province (De Witte and Dijkgraaf, 2007). While there were 111 
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utilities in 1975, 32 companies in 1997, only 10 companies remained in 2007 (although the utilities 
can still be labeled as medium sized companies in comparison with, e.g., some English companies). It 
is expected that in the near future only 3 to 6 companies will prevail.  
Since 2003, the national government reserved the sector as a public domain, which implies a 
moratorium on private investments. Therefore, only the provincial and municipal authorities can be 
the shareholders of the utilities which are organized as limited companies under company law (i.e. 
Public Limited Company, PLC). The drinking water act (temporarily) settled the 1997-debate on the 
privatization of water services as the water companies are allocated to an exclusive provision area 
(although large customers with more than 100,000 m³ per year can choose their supplier). Both the 
water boards and the drinking water utilities are coordinated in sector organizations, respectively, the 
Association of Water Boards (Unie van Waterschappen) and VEWIN (Vereniging van 
Waterbedrijven). Particularly the latter is of importance for the remaining of this section, as it 
organizes the benchmark since 1997 (Van Dijk et al., 2007).  
 
3.2 The benchmark 
 
In 1997, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs launched a project to deregulate markets with 
monopolistic power, among which the drinking water sector. In an influential study, Dijkgraaf et al. 
(1997) compared the possibilities for different degrees of competition in the market. As the sector was 
not influenced by incentives to monitor and improve the efficiency, it was expected that increased 
market processes would enhance efficiency. To avoid competition in or on the market, and to 
circumvent the liberalization and privatization idea, VEWIN started in 1997 on a voluntary basis a 
benchmarking process (by the help of an external consulting company to carry out the benchmark and 
by accountants to check the values). By the use of performance indicators for Water Quality, Services, 
Environment and Finances, on both the company level, process level (e.g. production, distribution, 
sales and general management) and sub-process level (e.g. cost per meter pipe), the benchmark was 
expected to generate information and to provide transparency in the sector. Started as a voluntary self-
regulation project, the benchmark is made compulsory by law (2005). The utilities receive yearly a 
detailed internal report and every three years an external report is published. The latter is closely 
followed by the national media and the Dutch citizens. Before disclosing new variables to the general 
public, drinking water utilities report the variables internally in the two proceeding years. Besides the 
internal carrots (managers negotiate contracts with bonuses depending on the benchmark results) and 
external rewards (the benchmark outcomes are closely monitored by the public opinion which are the 
voters of the municipal delegates), the government does not attach bonuses nor sanctions on the 
benchmark outcomes (i.e. self-regulation by the sector).   
The benchmark proved to be highly effective. Dijkgraaf et al. (2007) and VEWIN (2007a) estimated 
the efficiency improvement of the benchmark at 23% since 1997. In addition, also service levels, 
investments and quality significantly improved. Although the efficiency in the sector drastically 
improved, nominal prices did not decrease, so that profits of the drinking water companies expanded 
(for a discussion on the profits and profit drivers, De Witte and Saal, 2008). The accumulation of 
profits results in a high solvability of the sector (on average 30%) and high returns on net assets (for 
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the three largest companies in 2006, 12.5%, while e.g. in England and Wales the return is 6.5% before 
tax).   
Furthermore, the current benchmark, based on performance indicators is not perfect. Besides figures 
for profits, the benchmark should account for exogenous characteristics which are beyond the scope of 
the firm’ s managers. The quality of the drinking water provision area differs, so that uncorrected 
performance indicators are partially incomparable. Also small differences in accounting rules and in 
employed definitions make a fair comparison intricate.  
The decreasing number of drinking water utilities diminishes the effectiveness of benchmark as the 
number of comparable units falls. Therefore, VEWIN started, at the end of 2005, an international 
benchmark with some Scandinavian utilities, and by the end of 2007 its scope was enlarged to English 
and German utilities (VEWIN, 2007b) 
 
 
4. THE BELGIAN WATER SECTOR 
 
As a federal country, the Belgian water industry has been regionalized since 1980. This shift in 
responsibilities from the national state level to the regional state level, significantly altered the existing 
homogeneity in the sector as the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels region are characterized by a large 
structural, cultural and geographical diversity (Aubin and Varane, 2007). In addition, the Flemish and 
Brussels region have few water resources of their own, so that they are, respectively, about 25% and 
97% dependent on Wallonia. Thanks to strict European legislation and the increasing awareness of the 
customers, the previously little regulated sector is changing. In this section, we discuss the regulatory 
and legislative framework of the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels water sectors and briefly explore the 
Walloon benchmark.   
 
4.1 Institutional framework   
 
Since the establishment of Belgium in 1830, the municipalities hold the responsibility to provide 
drinking water to their citizens. Initially, the sector was dominated by municipal services (on the 
payroll of the municipality) and municipal suppliers to supply drinking water. However, to respond to 
the capital intensity of the sector and the continuously stricter legislation, the municipalities organized 
themselves into inter-municipal utilities. Nowadays, the Flemish region counts only 6 municipal 
suppliers and 3 inter-municipal utilities. Although the Walloon government insists by the ‘code de 
l’ eau’  on a rationalization of the number of drinking water companies, it still comprises some 
municipal services and municipal suppliers and 13 inter-municipal utilities. If the municipalities 
refrained to supply drinking water, the national company (NMW) would take over this responsibility. 
Due to the regionalization, in Flanders the NMW was converted into the ‘Vlaamse Maatschappij voor 
Watervoorziening’  (VMW), while in Wallonia the ‘Société Wallonne des Eaux’  (SWDE) was 
established. The former provides 40% of the Flemish population, while the latter counts half of the 
Walloon connections. The Brussels drinking water is provided (wholesale segment) by Vivaqua (an 
inter-municipal utility) and distributed by another inter-municipal utility (Belgaqua, 2007; Serv, 2007).  
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In Flanders, the integrated water system passes the responsibility of sewage treatment to the drinking 
water suppliers. Therefore, the drinking water utilities agreed with the monopolistic Aquafin, an initial 
public-private partnership to treat the sewage but since 2006 it became fully public. Though the 
responsibility for sewage shifted from the municipalities to the drinking water suppliers, the former 
can still decide on who should execute these tasks in their territory: either themselves or the drinking 
water utility. In Wallonia, the water treatment is not the exclusive power of the ‘Société publique de 
gestion de l’ eau’  (SPGE), the Walloon equivalent of Aquafin. Some inter-municipal utilities are 
providing both drinking water and treating the sewage themselves. In Brussels, the ‘The Brussels 
Water Company’  (BMWB) is responsible along with Vivaqua for the sewage treatment (Serv, 2007). 
Table 1 systematizes the Belgian market structure in 2007.  
 
Table 1 – Belgian market structure 
Direct public 
management 
Delegated public 
management 
Delegated 
private 
Direct public 
management 
 
W S1 W S2 W S W S 
Population 10% 100% 85% 100% 5% 0% 0% 0% 
Operators 47 47 10  
Trend     
W – Drinking water supply; S – Sewage; 1 – Collection; 2 - Treatment 
 
The regionalization of the sector in 1980 transferred the legislative authority from the national 
government to the regional authorities. At the national level, Belgaqua’ s main task is to represent the 
utilities at the national and supra-national forums. Although the regions did not establish a regulatory 
body stricto sensus, some important regulatory functions are held by the sector organizations. 
However, the Flemish government agreed to establish by July 2003 a regulatory entity whose aim was 
to survey, evaluate and provide advice on the transparency, the public service obligations, the 
investments, cost structures and yardstick competition. In contrast to other countries and regions, only 
few initiatives to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the Flemish drinking water sector have been 
developed. Despite the fact that most of the utilities provide information on the tariffs on their website, 
a full overview of the different companies is not available. In addition, none of the companies provide 
insight in the cost determining factors. In 2002, the Flemish sector organization SVW organized a 
benchmarking exercise after the Dutch example. Each participating company received a document 
with its own performances relative to a reference group. However, these results have never been 
released to the general public. From the three Belgian regions, the Walloon water sector is the most 
regulated one. The Commission for Water Control (CWC), integrated in the public administration, 
controls and supervises the tariff systems (although the final responsibility belongs to the federal 
Ministry of Economic Affaires), observes the legal obligations of the operators and implements 
performance indicators in order to increase the efficiency in the sector. In Brussels, the sector is 
supervised by the public administration in ‘Environment Brussels’ , though no regulatory body is 
established (Aquawal, 2006).  
The tariff system differs significantly among the three regions and even within operators, although all 
prices are supervised by a federal pricing commission (part of the federal Ministry of Economic 
Affaires) which determines the maximum prices. This can be explained by difference in the network 
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length, the degree of urbanization, the type of clients (i.e. size of the customers), the relative 
abundance of water and the source of water extraction.  
A detailed request should be submitted at least 60 days before the scheduled price increase. The 
following elements should be contained in the proposal: (1) the refusals and approvals of previous 
price increases; (2) the date of the previous price increase; (3) the full or partial price increase; (4) a 
detailed description of the tariff system; (5) the evolution in the volume of water use; (6) a 
comparative study with the results of the last three fiscal years; and finally (7) a detailed analysis of 
the costs and the revenues.  
In the Flemish region, the government determined to provide each domestic customer 15m³ drinking 
water for free (paid by increasing the price of the remaining volumes). This initiative to help 
disadvantaged people is seen by the sector as a powerful sign of the public aspect of the sector. The 
remaining consumption is billed by a fixed component and a variable component. The latter part is in 
general uniform or regressive (which favors medium and large sized customers), and only occasionally 
progressive (only for three operators). In general, the drinking water utilities charge the same fee both 
for small and large sized customers, although the very large customers can negotiate water prices 
individually. In addition to the 15m³ free drinking water, only two inter-municipal utilities give a 
reduction for low income customers. The sewage tariff consists of two components which are both 
collected by the drinking water utilities: the sewage treatment and sewage collection. The former 
concerns the fee for Aquafin (in 2006, 0.6798 euro per m³ without VAT of 6%), while the latter 
encompasses the costs of the municipality to collect sewage (autonomous determined fee by the 
municipality, with a maximum of 1.5 times the treatment costs). The law foresees for large sized 
customers a reduction in the sewage costs. We present the tariff system in 2006 in Table 2.  
In the Walloon region, by the ‘code de l’ eau’ , the government tries to make the water price uniform in 
the same water basin. Since 2005, the water price consists of a fixed and a variable component, 
regardless of the nature of the customers (domestic or non domestic). Both parts should reflect the 
‘truth-cost’  of water and sewage provision. The variable component comprises four parts. Firstly, a 
progressive real distribution cost (CVD) which should be the same for all customers in the water 
basin. The CVD is yearly set by the federal pricing commission after a screening by the CWC. 
Secondly, a contribution of 0.0125 euro/m³ is invoiced for a social fund for disadvantaged people. 
Thirdly, a uniform fee for the Walloon region (determined by the SPGE) is levied to finance the water 
treatment (CVA). Finally, as in Flanders, the VAT amounts to 6% (Serv, 2007). The tariff system is 
presented schematically in Table 2.  
In Brussels, the tariff system for domestic customers consists of a fixed component and a progressive 
variable component, which is increased by a contribution of 0.01 euro/m³ for a social fund to allow 
reimbursement of the most disadvantaged families. The sewage contribution depends on local 
conditions (municipalities or regional system) and includes a fixed portion and two tiers variable to the 
consumption.   
 
Table 2 – Tariff system for domestic customers in Belgium  
Region 
Fixed component      
(   
Variable component 
(  ³) 
Social fund 
(  ³) 
Wastewater tariff      
(  ³) 
Flanders 39 – 57 0-15 m3 0 15 m3 free Aquafin Municipal 
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>15 m3 1,881-2,931 0,7730 variable 
Wallonia 20CVD + 30CVA 
0-30 m3 
30-5000 m3 
5000-25000 m3 
>25000 m3 
0,5CVD 
CVD+CVA 
0,9 CVD+CVA 
0,7CVD+CVA 
0,0125 
Together with the water 
sold 
Brussels 11,9 - 23,80 
0-15m³ 
15-30m³ 
30-60m³ 
>60 m³ 
0,80 
1,39 
2,06 
3,06 
0,01 
IBDE 
Regional 
0,3275 
IBDE 
Municipal
0,43 
 
Public service obligations are not settled by a federal law. Each of the three regions, taking into 
account the European Directives (e.g. water quality standards or abstraction protection), defined a set 
of minimum conditions for the drinking water utilities. In Flanders, besides providing 15m³ of free 
drinking water, the drinking water utilities defined a set of minimum obligations for the customers. 
These standards foresee financial compensation (around 25 euro) if the targets are not reached.  
In Wallonia, the ‘code de l’ eau’  established a social fund to subsidize less favored customers and 
allowed the CWC to develop a set of 13 indicators to measure the legal obligations of the utilities. 
These include the access to information, the respect for privacy of customers, the identification of 
workers, the time to answer complaints and requests, the quality of service, the clearness of the 
invoice and the easiness for payment (Aquawal, 2006).  
In Brussels, the main operator (IBDE) defined standard measures, aimed at protecting the interests of 
customers, but no financial contribution is provided if they are not respected. 
 
4.2 The Walloon benchmark 
 
Before the benchmarking project, which started in 2006 with first results expected by the end of 2007, 
the Walloon drinking water sector worked in a self-regulation system where public service obligations 
were not supervised, the quality of service was not controlled and sometimes not even known. The 
sector association, Aquawal, enhanced the standardization and dissemination of best practices and the 
disclosure of statistical information. To measure the performance of the utilities, the CWC developed, 
besides the public service obligations (see supra), a set of 15 performance indicators. These 
benchmark measures, calculated and provided by the operators, are divided into six classes: quality of 
service, abstraction protection, management and sustainability, pricing and management, coverage and 
solidarity and satisfaction of customers and communication. By these indicators, CWC wants to 
estimate and compare the evolution of the quality of service among operators (i.e. a sunshine 
regulation), and tries to create and stimulate the competition between the utilities (i.e. a yardstick 
competition or competition by comparison). In addition, the performance indicators and their target 
values allow for the implementation of a management system by objectives. The inclusion of context 
variables helps to interpret the performance indicators. Figure 3 presents systematically the scheme of 
CWC service regulation. 
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Others (DGRNE, 
SPGE, …) 
Water Control 
Commission 
Water 
Supplier 
Determination of performance indicators 
Qualitative assessment of indicators 
Assessment of price-quality balance and 
analyse of performance evolution 
Research of explanatory factors 
Appreciation of relation between financial 
plan and quality development plan 
Report transmission 
Opinion about price increasing asking 
Additional 
information  
Additional 
information  
 
 Figure 3 - Scheme application of performance indicators (Aquawal, 2006, p. 50) 
 
 
5. MEASURING EFFICIENCY OVER TIME 
 
Although the Netherlands, Flanders and Wallonia share many exogenous factors (in fact, they are 
working in a very similar environment with a high population density, water rich underground, 
comparable weather conditions, analogous expectations from the customers, similar geographical 
relief, etc.), the major difference lies in the stage of the benchmarking cycle. Whereas Flanders has not 
implemented a public benchmark yet, the Walloon utilities have started to benchmark only recently 
and the Dutch utilities have been self-regulated by benchmarking since 1997. This observation makes 
a comparison through time especially relevant. In particular we verify to which extent the resources 
are used to produce outputs and relate this efficiency score to the stage of the benchmarking project.  
To estimate the efficiency non-parametrically (i.e. without assuming any a priori assumption on the 
production frontier), we start from a best practice frontier. Consider therefore the two-dimensional 
Figure 4. We present the inputs x (x ∈ p+\ ) on the horizontal axis and the outputs y (y∈ q+\ ) on the 
vertical axis. In this two dimensional example, p = q = 1. The observations (also labeled as Decision 
Making Units, DMUs) are transforming the inputs into outputs with a different success. Consider 
observation DMU1 which uses x inputs to produce y outputs. Some observations are able to produce at 
least the same amount of outputs, with at most the same quantity of inputs (e.g. DMU2 to DMU5), so 
that DMU1 is dominated by these units. The undominated observations are considered as best 
practices.  
 
The non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model (Charnes et al., 1978) estimates 
efficiency of an observation relative to a convex hull around these best practice observations. In 
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particular, the DEA model assumes free disposability of the inputs and outputs: ( , ) ,x y∀ ∈ Ψ  if 
x x≥  and y y≤  then  ( , )x y ∈ Ψ , or in words: if a particular input-output combination ( , )x y  is 
feasible (i.e. it consists of the production set { }( , ) | , ,( , ) is feasible+ +Ψ = ∈ ∈\ \p qx y x y x y ), it should 
also be possible to produce y by more inputs and to produce by the input level x also less outputs. The 
corresponding best practice production set is defined as the set of undominated observations 
(undominated in both the input and output dimension):  
 { }( , ) | , , 1,...,p q i ix y x x y y i n++Ψ = ∈ ≥ ≤ =\ . (1) 
Additionally to the free disposability assumption, DEA assumes a convex shape of the frontier: if 
1 1 2 2( , ), ( , )x y x y ∈ Ψ , then [ ]0,1α∀ ∈ : 1 1 2 2( , ) ( , ) (1 )( , )x y x y x yα α= + − ∈ Ψ . As such, the 
corresponding best practice production set is defined as a convex hull of the undominated input-output 
combinations: 
1
1 1
( , ) | , , for ( ,..., ),
i
n n
p q
DEA i i i n
i i
x y x x y yγ γ γ γ++
= =
Ψ = ∈ ≥ ≤ ∑ ∑\  
  }1. . 1, 0, 1,...,ni i is t i nγ γ= = ≥ =∑ . (2) 
The assumption that 1 1
n
i iγ= =∑  assures that the best practice frontier is a convex hull around the 
observed data, and as such, implies variable returns to scale (VRS; Daraio and Simar (2007) prove 
VRS to be consistent whatever underlying model, and De Witte and Marques (2007b) claim its 
appropriateness for the water sector). 
As suggested by Farrell (1957), we can measure the relative efficiency of entities as the distance to the 
best practice frontier. The input-oriented approach (or horizontal inefficiency) searches for the 
minimal amount of inputs which an observation should use to produce a given amount of outputs if it 
would be as efficient as its best practice. Algebraically, this corresponds to 
{ }( , ) inf | ( , )x y x y∂ = ∂ ∂ ∈ Ψ  where 1∂ =  denotes efficiency and 1∂ <  inefficiency. Graphically, 
as presented in Figure 4, this corresponds to the relative distance AB/AC. The output-oriented 
approach (or vertical inefficiency) measures the maximal amount of outputs which could be produced 
with a given level of inputs if the observation is working as efficient as its best practice. This is 
algebraically measured as { }( , ) sup | ( , )x y x yλ λ λ= ∈ Ψ  where 1λ =  denotes efficiency and 1λ >  
inefficiency. This is reflected by the distance AE/ED. In this paper, we will focus on the input-
orientation as due to demand side restrictions the outputs of a water utility are fairly exogenous.  
A major criticism on the non-parametric DEA models lies in their deterministic nature and inability of 
statistical inference. Recently, Cazals et al. (2002) developed a more robust approach to account for 
these criticisms. Basically, the procedure consists of repeatedly and with replacement drawing m 
observations from the data set for which iy y≤ . As such, it constructs a partial frontier with m units 
(in contrast to the full frontier with all observations) relative to which we measure the efficiency by 
the input-oriented DEA problem. The procedure is repeated R times, after which the results are 
averaged so that we obtain the robust input-oriented DEA efficiency score. The major advantage of the 
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order-m approach lies in its possibility to draw statistical inference and in its robustness to outliers. 
The robust order-m approach of Cazals et al. (2002) is incorporated in our input-oriented DEA model.  
The above described DEA model is only valid for cross-section samples. In more interesting 
applications, we evaluate efficiency in a panel data set by the use of a Malmquist index (Caves et al., 
1982). The Malmquist index allows us to measure the change in efficiency over time and to 
decompose the latter into (1) a frontier shift, which reflects the change of the best practice frontier, and 
(2) a catching-up effect, which estimates whether the entities are closer to the best practice frontier. 
The Malmquist index is basically a decomposition of the robust input-oriented DEA model over two 
time periods. As such, it compares the shift of the frontier Ψ between periods t and t+1 (i.e. the 
evolution in efficiency of the best practices) and the efficiency of the evaluated observation relative to 
tΨ  and 1t+Ψ . In the two dimensional Figure 5, we present a frontier shift between period t and t+1. 
As in period t+1 the observations can produce more outputs with a given level of inputs, or vice versa, 
as in period t+1 the observations need less inputs to produce the same quantity of outputs, the sector 
experienced a technological progress (i.e. 1t t+Ψ ⊂ Ψ ). However, for the evaluated observation 
DMU1, the best practices (which constitute the frontier) improved their performances faster than 
observation DMU1. Therefore, the observation experiences a negative catching-up effect between the 
two periods.  
Algebraically, we measure the Malmquist index, using period t as benchmark technology, as (for a 
comprehensive description, Fried et al., 2008):  
1 1
1 1 ( , )( , , , ) ( , )
t t t
t t t t t
t t t
D x yM x y x y
D x y
+ +
+ +
=                         (3) 
where 1 1( , )t t tD x y+ +  denotes the efficiency of observation 1 1( , )t tx y+ +  with the reference technology 
of period t (i.e. compare observation 1 1( , )t tx y+ +  with observations in period t). An index of tM <,=,> 
1 denotes, respectively, a productivity growth, stagnation or decline between period t and t+1. 
However, to avoid the arbitrariness of choosing one or another benchmark period (indeed, selecting 
period t+1 as benchmark period gives other results), the Malmquist index is conventionally defined as 
the geometric mean of the two: 
1/21 1 1 1 1
1 1
1
( , ) ( , )( , , , ) ( , ) ( , )
t t t t t t
t t t t
t t t t t t
D x y D x yM x y x y
D x y D x y
+ + + + +
+ +
+
 
= ×  
                     (4) 
where M <,=,> 1 denotes, respectively, a productivity growth, stagnation or decline between periods t 
and t+1.  
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Figure 4 - The DEA approach 
 
 
Figure 5 - Efficiency measurement over time 
 
 
6. RESULTS OF THE MALMQUIST INDEX 
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To measure the frontier shift and efficiency change in the Belgian and Dutch drinking water sector, we 
apply the robust (Cazals et al., 2002) input-oriented DEA model with its Malmquist decomposition in 
the panel data set. The data are obtained from the sector organizations Belgaqua and VEWIN and from 
the annual accounts of the drinking water companies. As a result of the mergers in the Dutch drinking 
water sector, the number of utilities gradually decreased over the last years. To avoid the decreasing 
number of utilities in the sample (which could intricate the analysis as a smaller number of 
observations reduces the consistency of the DEA estimates) and to avoid sample size bias (indeed, an 
efficiency evaluation in a smaller sample increases the average and individual efficiency estimates),  
similarly as in De Witte and Dijkgraaf (2007), we decompose the variables of the 13 merged 
companies in 2005 to the 20 companies in 1995 by extrapolating the change in the variables in the 
merged utility to the sub-utility (although we use only data from 1999-2005). For an extensive 
discussion on how each variable of the merged utility is decomposed to the variables of the sub-utility, 
we refer to De Witte and Dijkgraaf (2007). Summary statistics are presented in Table 3. In spite of 
having experimented with several input variables (e.g. total costs, wage base and capital base), we 
selected two input and two output variables which are consensual in the literature (De Witte and 
Marques, 2007b). In particular, we use labor and capital as inputs. These are, respectively, proxied by 
the number of employees (in FTE) and length of the mains network (in km). The output variables 
measure the number of connections and the total volume of delivered drinking water. As this 
corresponds to the fixed tariff per meter and the variable tariff per m³, it captures the revenues of the 
drinking water companies. To estimate the efficiency shifts over time, we collected data from 1999, 
2001, 2003 and 2005. We selected 1999 as the first year of analysis as this corresponds to the 
presentation of the first public benchmark study in the Netherlands. In addition, De Witte and 
Dijkgraaf (2007) show that the effect of the benchmark is only noticeable from 1999 on. The data set 
consists of 27 Walloon, 5 Flemish and 20 Dutch utilities.6 
The results of the Malmquist decomposition are presented in Table 4. Values larger than 1 denote a 
relative productivity growth, negative values indicate a decline and values equal to 1 point to a steady 
state. First consider the average relative efficiency of ‘all countries’ . We observe in two out three time 
periods a positive productivity change (i.e. M > 1) which can be attributed to a combined positive 
frontier shift and catch-up effect. This indicates that both the best practice and non-best practice 
observations improve their performances.  
More interesting than the average scores of all countries are the country-specific performances. First 
consider the Walloon utilities which have positive productivity growth in all three periods. Especially 
the utilities which are lagging behind (the catch-up effect) are improving their performances. On the 
contrary, the Flemish utilities do not seem to improve their performances. Their efficiency decreases 
in the first and the last periods. Nevertheless, the best Flemish utilities seem to keep track and steadily 
improve their performances (i.e. the frontier shift is larger than 1 in each of the three periods). Finally, 
consider the Dutch utilities where performance improved in the first and last periods thanks to a 
combination of best practice improvements and catching-up effect. Only in the 2001-2003 period, did 
the performance decline due to both best practice and non-best practice deterioration.  
                                                
6
 Notice that the analysis is performed on one aggregate sample consisting of utilities from Wallonia, Flanders 
and the Netherlands. However, separating the Flemish and Walloon utilities and the Flemish, Walloon and Dutch 
utilities gave very similar outcomes, as there is a significant correlation among the subsamples of, respectively, 
more than 0.93 and 0.91. 
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7. GAMING THE STAKEHOLDERS  
 
The absolute values of the Malmquist index shed some light on the sectors and especially the different 
directions of the productivity growth provide an interesting observation. The Flemish drinking water 
sector, which does not undertake a systematic benchmarking, decreases its productivity in two out 
three time periods. Conversely, both the Walloon and the Dutch drinking water sector, which use 
benchmarking tools, experience a productivity increase. Nevertheless, the self-regulatory aspect in the 
Dutch sector seems to take its toll as the productivity change is barely larger than 1 in the last period 
(the middle period shows even a negative productivity change).  
The different directions of the productivity growth could originate from attempts to ‘game’  the 
regulator (Jamasb et al., 2003, 2004). The three sectors are characterized by the presence of 
professional associations with strong powers over the sector and over the politicians. As a rule, 
professional associations do not like regulators or benchmarking. On the one hand, regulation 
interferes with their activity, and on the other hand benchmarking provides transparency to the sector 
and distinguishes the best practices from the worst. As the benchmarks generally correspond to a small 
number of players, the majority of the utilities are embarrassed. Besides, the increased transparency 
will reduce profits and existing privileges.  
In the Netherlands, since the 1990s there has been a huge discussion about the privatization and the 
creation of water regulators (see also Section 2 and De Witte and Saal, 2008). Influenced by the good 
outcomes of the energy regulators, governments and think-tankers launched this issue to the public 
opinion. The water industry heavily rejected the idea arguing that it already presented good 
performance, even with public ownership and without strict (economic) regulation. Nevertheless, the 
water utilities committed themselves to further improve their performance by a sunshine regulation 
(since 1997 and published every three years since 1999). The increased transparency significantly 
improved the productivity in the period of 1999-2001 (which is confirmed by previous studies: De 
Witte and Dijkgraaf, 2007; De Witte and Saal, 2008). However, as new debates on the regulatory 
system have emerged since 2001 (in particular, the government wanted to establish an independent 
regulator which would apply yardstick competition), the utilities feared its impact and no longer 
participate in the benchmark (the participation rate to the voluntary benchmark (edition 2003) 
significantly decreased). As a result, productivity declined (as also observed by De Witte and Saal 
(2008) by using a profit decomposition). In a third period (2003-2005), the sector was enrolled in new 
discussions about the ownership of the sector (the Eigendomswet). The water companies, trying to 
renegotiate with the government their status quo, improved their effectiveness and efficiency. The 
debate effectively triggered productivity again. Notice that in the Netherlands, during this period, the 
profits were high and above the average of other industries. The monopoly power, even with the 
benchmarking tool implemented, was kept. Looking from a different angle, benchmarking without 
practical effects (the ‘sticks’  or the ‘carrots’ ) always produces limited outcomes. In the first time 
period, trying to keep the sector as a public domain worked as an effective ‘carrot’ . In the second time 
period, the ‘stick’  of the independent regulator had a perverse effect. Finally, in the third period, the 
ownership debate worked as a ‘carrot’ .   
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Similar ‘gaming’  can be observed in Flanders. Initially (1999-2001), there was no effective threat to 
the water utilities so that the quiet life could prevail. This naturally results in a negative productivity 
growth. After a public debate in the beginning of 2000, privatization and strict regulation were heavily 
discussed. The water industry reacted promptly and the utilities became more efficient and innovative 
such that productivity increased. Nevertheless, the Flemish government enacted, in 2003, a law which 
included an independent regulator. However, as this regulator after 5 years is still not in place and as 
there are no signs that its establishment is for the near future, the water utilities returned to the quiet 
life. They acknowledged the inability of the Flemish government in the regulation of the water sector.7 
In the period under study, the Walloon utilities increased their productivity (although potentially the 
scope for improvement was larger as well). Similarly to other sectors, there was a debate about 
privatization and regulation. Even though the utilities tried to avoid the regulatory burden, the Walloon 
government effectively established a regulator. In spite of applying only the light-handed sunshine 
approach, there were good outcomes. Besides the benefits of this light-handed regulatory method, the 
possibility of a change to a more coercive and intervening role in the regulation of the water sector 
represented also a good incentive for the water industry to go on improving the productivity. The 
empirical results stress this gaming.  
Summarizing, the importance of the water associations in gaming the stakeholders in the water sector 
in the Low Countries is well highlighted. We observed that the presence of benchmarking or even just 
the threat of its implementation led to a productivity improvement. Besides, the creation of a regulator 
can push the water utilities towards the best practices. Furthermore, the Malmquist decomposition 
reveals that in the Low Countries the productivity change is almost always driven thanks to the catch-
up factor and that the change in the technology (frontier shift) is only limited. Indeed, in contrast to 
other network sectors, technological improvements in the water sector are often negative (due to 
quality improvements) and very small.  
 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper discussed the use of benchmarking in water utilities. Comparing three well comparable 
regions in Low Countries (well comparable in terms of very similar exogenous factors) by the use of a 
dynamic non-parametric Malmquist decomposition, we find that the utilities are ‘gaming’  the different 
stakeholders. The presence and the threat arising from benchmarking and even from regulation create 
different behaviors in terms of productivity improvement. We observed that if the water utilities are 
provided with the appropriate incentives they are able to improve their productivity significantly, but 
if there are no “ carrots”  (nor “ sticks” ) the water industry will game the stakeholders abusing from the 
quiet life and the monopoly power.       
 
                                                
7
 Notice that the Flemish region attaches a significant importance to social issues, for example by the provision of free water 
to householders (until 15 m³). This could be a reason why economic regulation is more difficult to implement. 
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Table 3 - Summary statistics 
 
Table 4 - Results Malmquist decomposition 
    1999-2001     2001-2003     2003-2005   
All countries Malmquist  Catch-up Frontier shift Malmquist  Catch-up Frontier shift Malmquist  Catch-up Frontier shift 
Average 1.0827 1.0779 1.0082 0.9918 0.9985 0.9954 1.0281 1.0325 1.0029 
St. Deviation 0.3298 0.3306 0.0627 0.2149 0.2226 0.0645 0.1728 0.1987 0.0775 
Minimum 0.6295 0.5486 0.8901 0.6211 0.6249 0.8795 0.4819 0.4927 0.8354 
Maximum 2.8420 2.7908 1.1474 1.9128 2.0425 1.1538 1.6247 1.7263 1.2318 
Wallonia                   
Average 1.1180 1.1124 1.0084 1.0273 1.0309 0.9993 1.0753 1.0854 0.9966 
St. Deviation 0.4484 0.4459 0.0590 0.1555 0.1596 0.0720 0.1607 0.1907 0.0653 
Minimum 0.6295 0.5486 0.8901 0.7459 0.7175 0.8795 0.8283 0.7860 0.8654 
Maximum 2.8420 2.7908 1.1474 1.3189 1.3636 1.1538 1.6247 1.7263 1.1622 
Flanders                   
Average 0.9770 0.9489 1.0330 1.0364 1.0349 1.0014 0.8911 0.8796 1.0136 
St. Deviation 0.0758 0.0845 0.0804 0.1185 0.1017 0.0520 0.2373 0.2242 0.1062 
Minimum 0.8844 0.8529 0.9165 0.9187 0.9538 0.9109 0.4819 0.4927 0.8880 
Maximum 1.0883 1.0528 1.1143 1.2322 1.2058 1.0350 1.0870 1.0625 1.1810 
The Netherlands                   
Average 1.0616 1.0635 1.0017 0.9326 0.9458 0.9887 1.0010 1.0019 1.0085 
St. Deviation 0.1025 0.1160 0.0649 0.2863 0.3021 0.0587 0.1548 0.1858 0.0877 
Minimum 0.8733 0.8210 0.8976 0.6211 0.6249 0.8832 0.6728 0.5462 0.8354 
Maximum 1.1992 1.2195 1.0945 1.9128 2.0425 1.0812 1.2970 1.3838 1.2318 
Wallonia  
Length 
mains 
Staff Connect. 
Distributed 
volume 
Flanders  
Length 
mains 
Staff Connect. 
Distributed 
volume 
1999 mean 1,362 124 38,489 4,552,253 1999 mean 9,941 608 363,370 60,426,562 
 st dev 5,362 360 127,508 14,573,583  st dev 11,229 547 378,537 45,051,837 
 max 28,000 1,372 639,526 73,041,454  max 28,588 1,506 987,768 112,205,738 
 min 23 1 702 59,009  min 943 46 27,098 4,593,270 
2001 mean 1,151 130 40,291 4,657,146 2001 mean 10,192 615 394,575 60,841,608 
 st dev 4,099 373 128,878 14,614,026  st dev 11,279 536 381,398 44,355,566 
 max 21,390 1,464 642,213 72,478,755  max 28,844 1,494 1,012,050 113,582,574 
 min 20 1 700 62,320  min 953 48 27,559 4,385,903 
2003 mean 1,278 133 41,094 4,734,663 2003 mean 10,422 614 416,254 63,692,763 
 st dev 4,330 384 132,712 15,055,725  st dev 11,354 527 388,923 41,801,151 
 max 22,547 1,447 664,466 74,828,498  max 29,161 1,479 1,032,816 117,001,068 
 min 25 2 705 63,754  min 997 49 27,844 4,831,999 
2005 mean 1,300 136 43,116 7,080,212 2005 mean 10,358 628 420,957 77,712,622 
 st dev 4,500 391 141,534 23,264,967  st dev 11,682 540 396,652 53,213,663 
 max 23,432 1,470 713,248 118,428,033  max 29,509 1,517 1,052,128 147,381,406 
 min 25 2 704 98,720  min 101 46 28,015 5,458,590 
Netherl.  
Length 
mains 
Staff Connect. 
Distributed 
volume 
Netherl.  
Length 
mains 
Staff Connect. 
Distributed 
volume 
1999 mean 4,993 365 280,871 56,186,100 2003 mean 5,514 279 308,223 60,035,719 
 st dev 2,939 257 155,012 35,341,380  st dev 3,196 181 165,476 36,096,447 
 max 10,309 980 620,608 145,112,000  max 11,783 593 649,192 153,143,389 
 min 680 61 83,003 11,877,650  min 683 50 87,127 12,278,332 
2001 mean 5,138 333 287,887 56,200,050 2005 mean 5,650 260 314,404 58,540,704 
 st dev 2,989 229 158,818 34,425,614  st dev 3,279 167 168,566 37,438,291 
 max 10,423 844 639,000 139,325,000  max 11,981 529 681,812 165,710,720 
 min 696 59 85,454 12,025,097  min 705 47 87,127 11,546,090 
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